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The boundaries of EU citizenship: reflections on borders, citizenship and 
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 Sandra Mantu1 
 
 
 
Borders and EU citizenship seen from critical migration studies  
 
Migration, borders and sovereignty have become inseparable companions. Human mobility 
captured by the legal notion of ‘migration’ is perceived as doing something to the state, its 
sovereignty and accompanying understanding of membership as national. What exactly this 
‘something’ is remains debated in scholarship but generally revolves around the demise of 
the nation state and accompanying ‘national’ forms of belonging epitomised by 
citizenship/nationality or, at the very least, their transformation under conditions of 
globalization. Elspeth’s scholarship has aptly engaged with these issues and with a view to 
understand the role played by law in these processes. One of her main contributions has 
been the framing of their analysis from the perspective of the individual migrant and his/her 
legal standing under the label of ‘critical migration studies’.2 This is a bold and unusual move 
in (legal) migration scholarship, which remains concerned with the state as the main actor 
and object of inquiry, its right to regulate migration across its borders, the state’s 
transformation as a result of migration, the impact of migration on inter-state relations etc. 
Until recently, Elspeth’s interest has been the EU since it has set out a particular vision of 
dealing with human mobility among its Member States as a fundamental freedom - the free 
movement of persons – which was later refashioned as EU citizenship. Its realization rests 
on the idea of building an ever-closer union among the participating states with a view to 
create a space without internal borders in which the nationals of the Member States can 
move freely. Scholarship has amply debated how the effacing of internal borders rests on 
the hardening of EU’s external borders. Elspeth has been one of the authors that have 
critically engaged with the notion of ‘fortress Europe’ as failing to capture the complexity of 
the border and its transformation into a filtering device; borders remain open for the bona 
fide migrant epitomised by tourists and businessmen, while filtering out the male fide 
migrants, usually the terrorists and the poor.3 This points towards borders as polysemantic 
categories of inquiry and the fallacy of truth claims based on simple dichotomies of 
inside/outside.4 
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Guild and Mantu (eds) Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration. Perspectives of Control from Five 
Continents, Asghate, pp. 207-228. 
4 R.B.J. Walker (2010) After the Globe, Before the World, Routledge. 
 2 
In this short contribution, my focus will be on EU citizenship as a site for observing and 
analysing the relationship between the state, borders and sovereignty. Elspeth’s emphasis 
on the individual migrant as bearer of rights is at home within the EU context, even more so 
after the introduction of EU citizenship and the proclamation of the right to free movement 
as a fundamental, individual and directly effective right given by the EU to the nationals of 
the Member States. In relation to the EU, Elspeth’s work repeatedly stresses the reversal of 
the traditional position of international law, where states have a sovereign right to control 
entry into state territory; rather, EU citizens hold a right to enter one of the other Member 
States and that state has a limited power to reject entry or residence.5 This constitutes a 
fundamentally different starting point from where to conceptualize migration that is 
grounded on EU citizens’ legally enforceable rights of entry and residence.   
 
My interest in the boundaries of EU citizenship is not linked with borders as lines or spatial 
constructions; rather I am interested in the conceptual boundaries of EU citizenship as the 
sites of struggles over the ownership, matter and direction of this notion. What I want to 
explore here is how some of the functions of borders – to differentiate, to delimitate, to 
define who belongs, to include/exclude – are played out in the notion of EU citizenship. 
What can we learn about the notion of EU citizenship when we interrogate it from its 
conceptual boundaries? Who is in and who is out of the reach of EU citizenship? This 
interrogation builds on an on-going discussion about the nature of EU citizenship – 
citizenship or migration status - that Elspeth has started in the research performed by the 
Centre for Migration Law in Nijmegen and which we hope to continue.  
 
 
Deconstructing the relationship between EU citizenship and state sovereignty 
 
The analysis below is informed by a number of insights that for reasons of space I can only 
summarise here.6 First, citizenship studies posit citizenship to be a bounded notion that 
relies, among others, on law to draw boundaries between those who are part of the 
community and those who are not. Secondly, the community is understood as a national 
one, while migration is seen to put pressure on the national character of membership as it 
constantly pushes for expansion of the community to the detriment of its cohesion. Thirdly, 
citizenship is a notion born out of contestation and struggles over the inclusion of parts of 
society into its franchise; the development of national citizenship alongside the 
establishment of the national state as the main form of political actor shows that these 
struggles can be legal, symbolic, political etc. and involve the stabilization of the fringes and 
of boundaries as means to ensure the viability of citizenship as a political construct. Critical 
legal scholars have described modern citizenship as being about the extension of the 
citizenship franchise to the poor as a pacifying move to ensure the stability of the social 
contract.7 Finally, in this contribution I focus on legal contestation as it emerges from the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in relation to EU citizens and their claims. This approach builds on 
                                                     
5 E. Guild (2004) The Legal Elements of European Identity. EU Citizenship and Migration Law, Kluwer Law 
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6 S. Mantu (2015) Contingent citizenship. The law and practice of citizenship deprivation in international, 
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7 S. Mantu (2017) Alternative views on EU citizenship, in C.A. Grutters, S. Mantu & P. Minderhoud (eds.) 
Migration on   the Move – essays on the dynamics of migration, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, pp. 225-246. 
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research undertaken with Elspeth in the ENACT project where we approached the ECJ as a 
site of citizenship enactment where understandings of what a citizen is are challenged and 
where EU citizenship is acted upon and constructed as the fundamental status of the 
nationals of the Member States.8 
 
I will explore the boundaries of EU citizenship in relation to three sets of issues associated 
with state sovereignty and which loosely correspond to the three elements in Weber’s 
definition of the state as encompassing a territory, a population and bureaucracy that 
engages in legitimate exercise of power - for my purposes here, I understand this last 
element as being about the governance of territory and people. These themes are also 
linked with some of the main criticisms voiced in scholarship around the time of the 
introduction of EU citizenship: its failure to include TCNs within its personal scope; its 
reliance on state nationality and its persistence in treating economically active and inactive 
mobile EU citizens differently in respect of residence and social rights. My aim is to 
understand if and how EU citizenship changes the exercise of sovereignty in these areas and 
with what consequences for EU citizens. My three areas of inquiry are:  
1. control over presence on state territory – static EU citizens and TCN family members  
2. rules of membership attribution – who is/can remain a national of an EU Member 
State? 
3. redistribution of resources as linked to the governance of people and territory – who 
can rely on the welfare state? 
 
Control over presence on state territory  
 
A state’s right to control the presence of foreigners on its territory is seen as an attribute of 
state sovereignty that is recognized by international law. It is also understood as the reverse 
side of the national’s right to be present on state territory (Article 12 ICCPR). Thus, in 
relation to the territory of their state of nationality, nationals enjoy a right to enter and 
reside that is linked to their status as nationals; to enter and reside within that same 
territory, foreigners require state permission. EU law grants EU citizens a right to enter and 
reside in another EU state (Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38) and limits the possibility 
of the host EU state to end this right by spelling out a limited number of grounds for 
expulsion – public policy, public security and public health – and situations in which 
residence can be terminated. Moreover, EU law offers material and procedural safeguards 
that EU states must observe as a matter of EU law when extinguishing rights.9 From the 
perspective of a state’s right to control the presence of foreigners on its territory, EU 
citizens enjoy a position that is much closer to that of state nationals than non-EU foreigners 
who remain the main subject of state control. Despite the growing Europeanization of 
migration legislation and the adoption of common rules on non-EU migrants, the Member 
States retain a tighter grip on this latter group’s access to and mobility within the EU than 
on EU citizens. Concerning expulsion, the ECJ has confirmed the special position enjoyed by 
                                                     
8 S. Mantu and E. Guild (2013) Acts of citizenship deprivation: ruptures between citizen and state, in E. Isin and 
M. Saward (eds) Enacting European Citizenship, Cambridge University Press, pp. 111-123. 
9 S. Mantu (2018) Expulsion of own nationals: what implications for EU citizenship?, Nijmegen Migration Law 
Working Papers Series, no 2018/06, Nijmegen: Radboud University Nijmegen. 
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(long-term resident) EU citizens in contrast to Turkish nationals stemming precisely from the 
introduction of EU citizenship and the distinctiveness of the EU project.10  
 
However, the manner in which the ECJ has interpreted the Treaty and secondary law 
provisions on EU citizenship has led to the extension of the protection stemming from EU 
citizenship to TCNs in their capacity as family members of EU citizens. The ECJ has ruled that 
in order to enjoy family reunion with an EU citizen, it was immaterial if the TCN family 
member had entered the territory of the host Member State irregularly.11 It was the 
position of the EU citizen exercising free movement rights that mattered and whether the 
family member fell in one of the categories sanctioned by EU law (Articles 2 and 3 of 
Directive 2004/38; Article 10 Regulation 492/2011). This jurisprudence has constantly 
expanded and now includes EU citizens who return to their Member State of nationality and 
wish to bring along a family member: where the exercise of free movement rights has been 
genuine and family life created or strengthened during that genuine exercise of free 
movement rights, the Member State of nationality must allow the family member to enter 
and reside with the national EU citizen as a matter of EU law.12  
 
Traditionally, the application of EU citizenship provisions on free movement and residence 
required the person to move from her/his state of nationality; it was primarily in the 
territory of another EU state that EU citizenship became relevant and its rights were 
activated.13 In its latest jurisprudence, the Court extends the reach of EU law to static EU 
citizens who have never moved. Their position in law is no longer captured exclusively by 
their status as nationals; it is a combination of ‘national’ and ‘EU citizen’ that dictates the 
legal regime applicable to their family reunification claims. As EU citizens, the nationals of 
the Member States may rely on the rights pertaining to that status including against the 
Member State of which they are a national.14 Although Article 20 TFEU does not give 
autonomous rights of residence to TCNs, in certain exceptional circumstances a right of 
residence must nevertheless be granted to a TCN who is a family member of an EU citizen if 
as a consequence of such a refusal, the EU citizen would be obliged in practice to leave the 
territory of the EU as a whole, denying him the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred by virtue of the status of EU citizen.15  
 
Initially, it seemed that EU citizenship transforms state sovereignty over territory in respect 
of EU citizens but leaves intact that sovereignty when it comes to TCNs and EU citizens who 
reside in their state of nationality (either because they have never moved or because they 
have returned there). ECJ jurisprudence disproves both of these assumptions as EU 
citizenship expands the pool of persons over whose entry and residence the Member States 
can no longer claim an exclusive right of control. In its expansion to capture EU citizens and 
their family members, EU citizenship creates a direct link between the EU citizen and ‘EU 
                                                     
10 Case C-371/08 Ziebell, EU:C:2011:809. 
11 Case C-127/08 Metock, EU:C:2008:449. 
12 Case C-456/12 O&B, EU:C:2014:135 ; Case C-457/12 S&G, EU:C:2014:136. 
13 For example, the right to diplomatic protection is an exception, as it is to be enjoyed while outside the 
territory of the EU. 
14 Case C-304/14 CS, EU:C:2016:674, para 24. 
15 Case C-164/14 Rendon Marin, EU:C:2016:675, para 74; Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354. 
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territory’ as the space within which this status and the rights attached to it are to be 
enjoyed. 
 
Rules of membership attribution 
 
Nationality attribution – the rules prescribing the acquisition and loss of state nationality are 
part of the state’s sovereign right to define membership in the national community. For 
states, having a defined citizenry is important for asserting their external sovereignty as well 
as their domestic capacity to extract resources (taxes, performance of military services etc.). 
EU citizenship retains not only a symbolic link to state nationality, but also a functional one. 
Article 20 TFEU states that EU citizenship is held by the nationals of the Member States and 
is additional to state nationality without replacing it. Declaration no 2 on nationality of a 
Member State16 formalises the position of the Member States that view nationality as 
within their reserved domain (sovereignty) since EU citizenship remains dependent on the 
definitions supplied by the Member States concerning who is a state national for the 
purposes of EU law. 
 
Although the EU has no competence in respect of state nationality and EU citizenship is an 
additional status, the ECJ has ruled that where nationality decisions taken by the Member 
States affect the rights conferred and protected by EU law, national rules have to be 
interpreted and reviewed in light of EU law, even if they comply with international law. In 
other words, the Member States must have due regard to EU law in the exercise of 
nationality powers.17 The exact implications of having ‘due regard to Community law’ (now 
Union law) have been constructed on a case by case basis but at its core is the idea that the 
nationality rules applied by the Member States may be modified or not applied when they 
constitute a breach of EU law.  
 
ECJ’s inroads into state sovereignty over nationality attribution involve a delicate ballet. On 
one hand, the ECJ remains tributary to an understanding of nationality as an emotional 
bond, rather than a legal one, which translates into a cautious review of the objectives 
pursued by the Member States when deciding what principles of attribution to use. For 
example, in Kaur18, the UK could legitimately provide the exclusion of certain categories of 
British citizens from the scope of EU citizenship in line with its history as a colonial power 
without clashing with EU law. In Rottmann, the ECJ held that states could legitimately seek 
to protect public interests linked to fraudulent naturalizations by allowing for withdrawal of 
nationality even if this leads to loss of EU citizenship and statelessness. In Tjebbes19 the 
Dutch state can legitimately seek to limit dual nationality in case of habitual residents 
abroad even if such measures lead to loss of EU citizenship. One the other hand, there is a 
clear recognition of the fact that loss of state nationality has EU implications that national 
authorities have to streamline into their nationality procedures and discuss alongside 
                                                     
16 Declaration no 2. on nationality of a Member State annexed to the final act of the Treaty on European Union 
together with the decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council at 
Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992. 
17 Case C-369/90 Michelletti, EU:C:1992:295; Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104. 
18 Case C-192/99 Kaur, EU:C:2001:106.  
19 Case C-221/17 Tjebbe,s EU:C:2019:189. 
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national interests.20 Proportionality and individual assessment play a crucial role in 
legitimizing state nationality decisions from the perspective of EU citizenship. For 
individuals, the Court’s position adds an extra layer of protection against loss of nationality 
as it requires national authorities to check compatibility with EU law as an additional 
element.  
 
The most remarkable aspect of the Court’s case law is the shifting point of reference in 
dealing with nationality: it no longer is state sovereignty, but EU citizenship as a status 
worthy of protection. This process starts with Rottmann, where the ECJ ruled that a national 
measure of citizenship deprivation leading to loss of EU citizenship ‘falls, by reason of its 
nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law’.21 EU citizenship 
offered the Court the tools to break away from the script of international law that views 
nationality as an exceptional field of law within the sovereignty of the state where very little 
or no interference is acceptable. What happens in the EU context is that the rules no longer 
reflect only national interests but also EU ones and the two can diverge as EU citizenship 
becomes a status worthy of protection on its own. What we notice is not simply loss of state 
sovereignty over deciding who is a member of the national community but a transformation 
of sovereignty practices to include the EU level into decision making over membership 
attribution and the protection of the rights stemming from EU citizenship. 
 
Redistribution of resources 
 
Ferrera describes the welfare state as a basic political good – an instrument serving the 
purpose of facilitating social cooperation, managing conflicts, sustaining generalized 
compliance and thus, ultimately keeping the polity together.22 Welfare states are also 
territorial and bounded constructs meant to serve the national community. Despite the 
existence of EU rules addressing social security coordination, there is no harmonized EU 
welfare state; rather there are twenty-eight national welfare states. The extent to which 
mobile EU citizens have a right to access the welfare system of their host state and be 
included in the pool of persons entitled to redistribution of resources via the payment of 
social benefits remains a salient and contested issue. When introduced in 1992, EU 
citizenship was seen as relevant only for those who already enjoyed rights under than 
Community law measures for economically active persons (workers, self-employed or 
service providers), including equal treatment with nationals in the social sphere. The 
position of economically inactive citizens is more complex: they enjoy free movement rights 
but their exercise remains conditional on financial self-sufficiency, at least for the first five 
years before they acquire a right of permanent residence. They also enjoy equal treatment 
based on Article 18 TFEU and Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 but exceptions from the 
general rule are envisaged. The requirement for self-sufficiency complicates matters further 
since requests for social benefits risk being interpreted as evidence of lack of resources.  
 
                                                     
20 Ibidem. 
21 Rottmann para 42. 
22 M. Ferrera (2018) The European Social Union: how to piece it together, in Vanhercke B., Ghailani D., and 
Sabato S. (eds), Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2018, Brussels, European Trade Union 
Institute and European Social Observatory . 
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In its first decade, EU citizenship underwent a process of expansion that saw the 
strengthening of the legal position of economically inactive EU citizens as the social rights 
attached to their status started to be taken seriously by the Court. According to the ECJ, EU 
citizens can expect to enjoy a certain degree of (financial) solidarity when exercising their 
free movement rights. This process started with the Martinez Sala23 case and was taken 
further in the Grzelczyk case, where the court ruled  that the applicable law ‘accepts a 
certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and 
nationals of other Member States, particularly if the difficulties which a beneficiary of the 
right of residence encounters are temporary’.24 To reach this conclusion, the CJEU relied on 
the fact that the Maastricht Treaty had introduced EU citizenship, which was described as 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, and a new 
chapter devoted to education and vocational training. The Court’s expansive interpretation 
of the rights of economically inactive EU citizens started to slow down after the start of the 
economic crisis of 2008 and at the moment it can even be described as having been halted 
as a result of restrictive interpretations given by the Court to the rights of mobile EU citizens 
in cases such as Brey, Dano or Alimanovic.25 The Court's recent jurisprudence emphasizes 
that those EU citizens who are entitled access to the welfare state must reside legally in line 
with the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38 - if they are not workers, self-employed or 
permanent residents, they need to have sufficient resources not to become a burden on the 
host state. In Brey, asking for social benefits was seen as an indication that the person does 
not meet the sufficient resource condition of Article 7 Directive 2004/38, while in the Dano 
case this had become a certainty.26 This leads to the rather moot situation where social 
solidarity is only reserved for those who are financially self-sufficient and do not have to rely 
on solidarity claims. 
 
Awarding access to the host state’s welfare state as a matter of EU law remains a contested 
aspect of EU citizenship, especially because of its potential to undercut national 
mechanisms of social redistribution. Despite an expansionist jurisprudence in the area of 
social rights, the reach of solidarity remains different depending on the legal category under 
which one exercises free movement rights: EU citizens exercising mobility rights as 
economically active persons enjoy a larger degree of social and financial solidarity with the 
nationals of the hosts state than their economically inactive counterparts. The increasing 
politicization of EU mobility  as ‘poverty migration’ questions the desirability of EU citizens’ 
mobility and addresses it through the lens of EU citizens being burdens on the host welfare 
state. In light of these developments, one can question EU citizenship’s capacity to expand 
the boundaries of the welfare state. Yet, notwithstanding exceptions from equal treatment 
for economically inactive EU citizens, jobseekers and students prior to the acquisition of 
permanent residence and ECJ’s retreat on social solidarity, the general position that 
requires the inclusion of mobile EU citizens into the welfare systems of their host states as a 
matter of EU law creates a form of social citizenship with supranational features that is not 
matched in international law. While ECJ jurisprudence can be seen as an expression of the 
                                                     
23 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala, EU:C:1998:217. 
24 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 44. 
25 Case C-140/12 Brey, EU:C:2013:565; Case C-333/13 Dano, EU:C:2014:2358; Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, 
EU:C:2015:597. 
26 S. Mantu & P. Minderhoud (2017) EU citizenship and Social Solidarity, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 24 (5), pp 703-720 
 8 
failure to develop a fully-fledged normative model of welfare entitlement that completely 
escapes the national, EU citizenship nevertheless opens up national welfare systems 
towards certain categories of EU citizens and demands their equal treatment.  
 
Conclusions  
 
The changes brought by EU citizenship to the manifestations of state sovereignty in relation 
to territory, population and the welfare state point towards changing power relations 
between the EU and its Member States that affect the position of individuals as they 
become inscribed into the supranational. The traditional argument is that as a result of EU 
making inroads into state sovereignty, the Member States lose their sovereignty in favour of 
the EU, become weaker in the process and less capable of delivering their part of the social 
contract. In my view it is better to speak of transformation of state sovereignty as a result of 
EU citizenship being superimposed on state nationality. This leads to a changed relationship 
between the individual and the territory which s/he inhibits as well as to changed terms of 
engagement between the individual and the administration in relation to claiming legal 
identity or social rights. New sovereignty practices develop as a result of the shrinking or 
enlarging of EU citizenship and the fact that the borders of state nationality are not 
coterminous with those of EU citizenship.  
 
The boundaries of EU citizenship are flexible enough to capture not only the mobile but also 
some static EU citizens and their TCN family members who can benefit from the rights of EU 
citizenship. While formally excluded, they nonetheless are inside the sphere of EU 
citizenship. EU citizenship brings along additional layers of protection in relation to family 
reunification or retention of state nationality that are made possible by a shift in how the 
holder of the right is legally constructed: no longer only a national citizen, but also an EU 
one. This shift requires a reframing of the boundaries between national and EU spheres of 
competence. These boundaries remain contingent as shown by the discussion on the 
welfare state and the politicization of EU mobility as poverty migration. EU citizenship 
encapsulates the possibility of escaping national fringes by using EU rights to overcome 
one’s national exclusion. However, legal and political developments confront us with the 
disturbing possibility that when exercising EU citizenship rights the national poor do not 
escape their condition, instead they are transformed into ‘EU poor’, equally vilified and 
excluded. Formally included, they turn out to be in practice excluded from the ideal of EU 
citizenship as a citizenship status that requires equal treatment. This makes the boundary an 
interesting vantage point to reflect on the wider construct as there is no clear inside or 
outside. 
